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THE PROMISE OF METACHEMISTRY  
In 1940 appeared La Philosophie du Non by Gaston Bachelard. The American edition of 1968 
translates the title obviously enough as The Philosophy of No and 10 years later, the German 
followed with Die Philosophie des Nein. And yet, Die Philosophie des Nicht would have been 
more appropriate and in English - impossible though it sounds - Philosophy of Non. After all, 
taking his cue from non-Euclidean geometry, Bachelard revels in the “non” of non-
Aristotelian logic, non-Cartesian epistemology, non-Baconian science, non-Kantian ontology, 
non-Newtonian mechanics, and non-Lavoisian chemistry. In all these cases, the “non” does 
not signal a negation or antithesis but marks Euclidean geometry as a special case of a 
differentiated non-Euclidean geometry, Lavoisian chemistry as a limited set of practices 
which is dialectically reflected in non-Lavoisian chemistry, etc. (Bachelard 1968, 55, 115)  
According to Bachelard, new experimental procedures and practices of the sciences introduce 
new ways of identifying, positioning, inferring, or stabilizing events. The sciences thus add 
over time new layers of conceptualization for properties to “take root” (Bachelard 1968, 45), 
new spectro-lines to the “epistemological profile” of notions like “mass,” “energy,” or 
                                            
1 Small papers with grand titles are bound to be programmatic. This one is no exception and, along with Nordmann (2000), 
marks only the beginning of what should become an extended course of inquiry.  
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“substance.” Bachelard, therefore, introduces his philosophy of the “non” not as a general 
theory of science but as an attempt to capture and articulate the significance of an emerging 
new science that creates in its wake also a new philosophy (cf. Bachelard 1984, 3): 
Bachelard’s “non” gives “some pre-sentiment of a profound revolution in chemical 
philosophy.” Signaling this imminent revolution, Bachelard continues, “metachemistry would 
already seem to be a possibility.”2 And: “Metachemistry would be to metaphysics in the same 
relation as chemistry to physics” (Bachelard 1968, 45). This essay explores Bachelard’s 
promise of metachemistry. Along the way, it assembles a series of clues that suggest that in 
the meantime, metachemistry has been more fully articulated or realized in the work of 
Bruno Latour.3 Though he does not use that term, Latour’s Pandora’s Hope (Latour 1999), for 
example, is a metachemical treatise. However, while Bachelard tries to determine for a new 
scientific age the relation between metaphysics and metachemistry, Latour offers 
metachemistry as a way to dissolve metaphysical pseudo-problems for science in general. 
This difference calls for an exploration of intellectual contexts. Beginning with the challenge 
issued by chemist- turned-philosopher Émile Meyerson, this exploration might continue with 
the response to that challenge by some-time-chemist Gaston Bachelard,4 and then perhaps 
conclude with Bruno Latour’s inheritance of Meyerson’s and Bachelard’s problematics even 
as he rejects their rationalism.5 However, instead of reconstructing contexts and trajectories 
of influence, the following remarks primarily attempt to get past the idiosyncrasies of 
Bachelard’s style - the excess of neologisms, in particular - and clarify his contrast of 
metaphysics and metachemistry:  
                                            
2 I am here following the French original: “Dès maintenant, une me t́a chimie nous paraît possible … La me t́a chimie serait 
à la me t́a physique dans le même rapport que chimie à la physique” (Bachelard 1981, 53).  
3 See Latour (1999, 142–144) on the relation between articulation and realization (a relation emphasized already by Charles 
Sanders Peirce). A metachemical stance has also been suggested in the later work of Feyerabend (1991, 507–521). 
4 He taught physics and chemistry from 1919 to 1930 at the Collège Bar-sur-Aube; one of his two dissertations of 1927 
concerned thermal propagation in solids; and in 1932 he published Le Pluralisme Coherent de la Chimie Moderne. On 
Bachelard’s philosophy of science see Tiles 1984. 
5 While Bachelard rejects Meyerson’s conservative or Lavoisian ontology of timeless identities rather than historicized 
substances, he shares with Meyerson the conviction that science rationalizes nature. Latour completes the critique of 
Meyerson when he rejects Bachelard’s rationalism and criticizes his view that epistemological breaks objectify science by 
displacing intuitive and mythologically “realistic” views (Latour 1995, 81 and 124ff.). 
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“Metaphysics could have only one possible notion of substance because the elementary 
conception of physical phenomena was content to study a geometrical solid 
characterized by general properties. Metachemistry will benefit by the chemical 
knowledge of various substantial activities. It will also benefit by the fact that true 
chemical substances are the products of technique rather than bodies found in reality. 
This is as much as to show that the real in chemistry is a realization.” (1968, 45)  
Bachelard’s suggestion can be unpacked by highlighting the various stages of this movement 
from different conceptions of “substance” to the physical, social, as well as conscious 
“realization of the real.” Implicitly and explicitly, the metaphysics and metachemistry of 
science will be juxtaposed throughout.  
 
 
THE SUBSTANCE OF “SUBSTANCE”  
Metaphysics, Bachelard suggests, operates with an impoverished, insubstantial notion of 
substance which it inherited - as did classical physics - from the Greek conception of science 
and its interest in that which persists through change.6 “Meta-physics could have only one 
possible notion of substance because the elementary conception of physical phenomena was 
content to study a geometrical solid characterized by general properties” (Bachelard 1968, 
45). 
The general properties of elements are the properties of matter, whether considered as 
extension and impenetrability or in terms of force or energy. From the spatiotemporal 
arrangements and re-arrangements of these elements, everything is thought to be composed. 
This notion of substance is entirely undifferentiated; it does not distinguish anything in 
particular but characterizes everything material. At the same time, it is generously 
hypothesized as a pervasive substrate of reality. According to physics and metaphysics, for 
everything that happens and for far more that could happen, there are latent, immutably 
lawful general properties waiting to be activated and to manifest themselves. Nature has thus 
become overpopulated with innumerable dormant powers that are semantically significant 
                                            
6 Aside from some of the following quotes, see Ted Benfey’s opening remarks at the 1999 International Conference on the 
Philosophy of Chemistry. 
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yet physically inconsequential.7 The varied critiques of metaphysics, therefore, targeted the 
hypothetical character of substance (though rarely its multiplication beyond necessity), but 
kept maintaining that all that could be meant by the term “substance” is a persistent 
constituent of reality.8 So, while some critics now claimed that reason or subjectivity is the 
substance of the world, and while others took the category “substance” in a Kantian manner 
as a conceptual pre-condition for the possibility of scientific knowledge, the term kept 
referring to something self-sufficient and undifferentiated: It is the stuff of the world that 
persists through change; it is an immutable carrier of accidental properties that is never 
directly or perceptually cognizable. Since substance is always, perhaps necessarily 
hypothesized, it is attended by the metaphysical question concerning its existence all the way 
down to the contemporary contest between the “cantankerous twins” of realism (or 
objectivism) and relativism (Feyerabend 1991, 515).9 
This physical conception of substance was questioned by scientific philosophers like F.W. 
Schelling, Charles Sanders Peirce, Émile Meyerson, and Alfred North Whitehead.10 With 
                                            
7 Bachelard describes how “each simple substance actually received a substructure. And the characteristic thing was that 
this substructure revealed itself as having a totally different essence from the essence of the phenomenon being studied. In 
explaining the chemical nature of an element by an organization of electric particles […] [a] sort of non-chemistry 
constituted itself to sustain chemistry” (Bachelard 1968, 52). 
8 This can be seen, for example, in two historical dictionaries of philosophy that represent the state of philosophical 
discussion at the time when Whitehead enters the scene with Bachelard following soon thereafter. See the entries on 
“Substanz” in Michaëlis (1907, 607–610) and in Eisler (1904, vol. 2, 450–464). 
9 These are “cantankerous twins” because they arose together along with the metaphysical conception of substance. 
According to Bachelard, for the metaphysical realist “existence is a one-toned function,” that is, everything is real or unreal 
in the same way, in that it either exists or does not exist - “the electron, the nucleus, the atom, the molecule, the colloidal 
particle, the mineral, the planet, the star, the nebula” (Bachelard 1968, 46). 
10 Indeed, the physical concept of substance was questioned implicitly also by the development of the sciences throughout 
the long 19th century (1780–1920), by the development of modern chemistry, statistical mechanics, Darwinism, 
electrodynamics, relativity and quantum theory. According to Wilhelm Ostwald, therefore, the notion of “substance” merely 
sets the task for scientists to determine what does and what does not possess the property of conservation or persistence 
(cf. Eisler 1904, vol. 2, 464). It would be a worthwhile project to see just how far back into the 19th century can be traced 
the notion that the chemical notion of substance is so deeply at odds with the physical one as to require a re-orientation of 
philosophy. As early as 1863, for example, Ernst Mach criticizes the mechanical conception of substance by suggesting its 
inapplicability to chemistry. One should not “imagine the chemical elements lying side by side in a space of three 
dimensions” or else “a crowd of the relations of the elements can escape us” (Mach 1911, 53, see 43, 54, and 86ff.). Lange 
quotes Mach in his History of Materialism (Lange 1925, 388). According to Bertrand Russell’s 1925-preface to the English 
edition, Lange’s own work contributed to the critique of substance, a concept that “persisted in the practice of physics” until 
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Bachelard, one might say that their critical questions introduce a chemical conception of 
substance into philosophy. For the chemist, the term “substance” designates first and 
foremost the particular elementary or compound stuff that stands at the beginning and at the 
end of a chemical process (cf. Bachelard 1968, 45, 49, 60, 70). As such, chemical substance 
is no hypothetical substrate but presents itself in chemical practice. Questions regarding its 
reality concern not its existence but how it makes itself known. Since chemical substance 
presents itself at different levels of laboratory experience, Bachelard posits a “laminated 
reality” for chemical substance- “substance does not have, at all levels, the same coherence” 
(Bachelard 1968, 46): 
“In the early days of organic chemistry people used to like to believe that synthesis 
merely served to verify the exactitude of a piece of analysis. Practically the reverse is 
true now. Chemical substances only get to be truly defined at the moment of their 
reconstruction.” (1968, 47) 
As long as synthesis was strictly an analog to analysis, chemistry retained a limited focus on 
the elementary substrate of particular compounds. At this level, substances are still 
individualized such that each chemical element might have its own substance (Stengers 
1994; Bensaude-Vincent 1994). The coherence of substance increased, however, when 
synthesis came into its own. The multiple techniques of realization established new chemical 
relations, suggested functional groupings, allowed for combinations produced in the 
laboratory to illuminate the combinations found in nature.11 To the extent that this chemical 
notion of substance became generalized only through the development of converging 
chemical techniques, the success of the chemist is at odds with the conceptualizations of the 
(metaphysical) philosopher: 
“In the face of a reality which has been so surely constructed, let philosophers equate 
substance, if they will, with that which evades cognition in the process of construction, 
let them continue, if they will, to define reality as a mass of irrationality.12 For a chemist 
                                            
the arrival of relativity theory. At the present time, according to Russell, physics can finally agree that “[n]othing is 
permanent, nothing endures; the prejudice that the real is the persistent must be abandoned” (Lange 1925, xii). 
11 Bachelard quotes a particular example concerning the chains of groups of CH2 from Mathieu (1936, vol. 1, p. 9). 
12 Bachelard’s strong claim that metaphysians “define reality as a mass of irrationality” is echoed and perhaps clarified by 
Bruno Latour. According to the latter, the metaphysical conception of substance recommends itself on first sight because it 
gives “a clear meaning to the truth-value of a statement”: Scientific statements can be said to refer if and only if substantial 
states of affairs correspond to it (for the tight connection between physical substantialism and the representability of states 
of affairs, see Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 2.0211). With the notion of reference, however, arises the problem of how to bridge 
the gap between language and world: “In spite of the thousands of books, philosophers of language have thrown into the 
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who has just realized a synthesis, chemical substance must, on the contrary, be equated 
with what one knows about it . . .” (1968, 47) 
This opposition is also present, for example, in Whitehead’s critique of the metaphysical 
notion of substance, a critique that employs chemical metaphors and ultimately refers to 
chemistry. According to Whitehead, when we posit that our sense perceptions are merely 
attributes of a substance, i.e., merely the effects in our minds of an underlying reality that is 
already given, “a distinction has been imported into nature which is in truth no distinction at 
all”: 
“what is a mere procedure of the mind in the translation of sense-awareness into 
discursive knowledge has been transmuted into a fundamental character of nature. In 
this way matter has emerged as being the metaphysical substratum of its properties ... 
“(1920, 16)13 
On Whitehead’s account, the “substance” or “substratum” of classical metaphysics results 
from a process of translation and transmutation, a procedure of the mind that ought to be 
recognized as such. “If we are to look for substance anywhere,” he concludes, “I should find 
it in events which are in some sense the ultimate substance of nature” (Whitehead 1920, 19). 
An example from chemistry helps define what an “event” is: It is “a nexus of actual 
occasions... For example, a molecule is a historic route of actual occasions; and such a route 
is an ‘event’” (Whitehead 1978, 80).14 
                                            
abyss separating language and world, the gap shows no sign of being filled […] except that now we have an incredibly 
sophisticated version of what happens at one pole - language, mind, brain, and now even society - and a totally impoverished 
version of what happens at the other, that is, nothing” (Latour 1999, 148). 
13 “The history of the doctrine of matter has yet to be written. It is the history of Greek philosophy of science. [...] The entity 
has been separated from the factor that is the terminus of sense awareness. It has become the substratum for that factor, 
and the factor has been degraded into an attribute of the entity. In this way, a distinction has been imported into nature 
that is in truth no distinction at all” (Whitehead 1920, 16). Elsewhere, Whitehead characterizes this transmutation as the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness. According to Bachelard, Kantianism moved from naive realism and traditional 
metaphysics to a critical rationalism that considers “substance” a category of the understanding (see Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, note on B xxi). Whitehead’s critical question places him between Kantianism and Bachelard’s third stage of chemical 
philosophy (Bachelard 1968, 45, 50ff.). 
14 Joseph Earley (1981) amplifies this chemical dimension of the “event.” Whitehead qualifies the “nexus of actual occasions” 
in a manner that threatens to sneak the abandoned metaphysics back in: The nexus is “inter-related in some determinate 
fashion in some extensive quantum” (1980, 80). Quite in the spirit of Bachelard’s “philosophy of ‘non’,” however, 
Whitehead’s non-metaphysical and metachemical conception of substance appears to explain metaphysics in metachemical 
terms, namely as a transmutation (as, for example, through misplaced concreteness). 
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Through a somewhat circuitous historic route of their own, Whitehead’s remarks would leave 
their mark on Bachelard’s Philosophy of Non.15 Bruno Latour refers to them more explicitly. 
He, too, shifts from “substance” with all its metaphysical baggage to “event” or “institution.” 
While this shift applies to all science, it originates in Latour’s discussion of the work of a 
chemist:16 
“What Pasteur made clear ... is that we slowly move from a series of attributes to a 
substance. The ferment began as attributes and ended up being a substance, a thing with 
clear limits, with a name, with obduracy, which was more than the sum of its parts. The 
word ‘substance’ does not designate what ‘remains beneath,’ impervious to history, but 
what gathers together a multiplicity of agents into a stable and coherent whole. A 
substance is more like the thread that holds the pearls of a necklace together than the 
rock bed that remains the same no matter what is built on it ... substance is a name that 
designates the stability of an assemblage.” (1999, 151, cf. 167 and 170)17  
Whitehead thus anticipated and Latour echoes Bachelard’s remark, quoted above, “that true 
chemical substances are the products of technique rather than bodies found in reality” 
(Bachelard 1968, 45). Now, if events, synthetic reconstructions, and technical realizations 
are in some sense the ultimate substance of nature, what happened to the original 
observation that chemical substance is first and foremost the particular, elementary or 
compound stuff that stands at the beginning and at the end of a chemical process? According 
to Bachelard, science adds to the “naively” realistic identification of substance (where 
“substance” is simply predicated) another, “rationalized” layer of meaning (which takes 
“substance” to be a category of the understanding). While these two layers of meaning exist 
together in each individual mind and while for each layer substance is what one knows about 
it, the two layers conjoined do not yield a single coherent notion of “substance.” This is how 
Bachelard’s conception of laminated or layered reality finally arrives at the third layer of 
“non-substantialism”: Just as a molecule traverses a historic route of actual occasions, so does 
                                            
15 Bachelard (1968, 66) refers for inspiration to a remark “Sur Whitehead” by Jean Wahl: “La réflexion sur Whitehead me 
fournit aujourd’hui un nouvel élément: a` l’idée de substance pourrait-on substituer l’idée de sur-stance? (Idée qu’un 
ensemble organique est quelque chose de supérieur à ses éléments). On retrouverait l’ente  ́ le  ́ chie aristotélicienne, la 
‘vérité  ́ ́hégélienne, l’émergence d’Alexander” (Wahl 1938, 931). A philosophical history of metachemistry would, therefore, 
have to consider wider contexts such as French existentialism. 
16 Latour may have been introduced to Whitehead through Isabelle Stengers, cf. Latour (1996, 1999) and Prigogine and 
Stengers (1984). 
17 Latour’s mixing of metaphors indicates just how difficult it is even for him to get away from appeals to prior substances. 
For Latour’s “search for a figure of speech,” see Latour (1999, 133–144). 
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the notion of ‘substance’ itself. And since that route itself is the event and since the event is 
in some sense the ultimate substance of nature, Bachelard finds that the ultimate substance 
of ‘substance’ has dissolved into its own history of rationalizations and conceptualizations 
(1968, 44, 72f., 76).18 
 
 
LAVOISIAN SCIENCE 
Bachelard’s construction extrapolates not only from the history of philosophy but also, more 
significantly, from that of chemistry. According to Bachelard and Meyerson before him, the 
development of chemistry itself offers a philosophical history of “sub- stance.” Like Meyerson, 
Bachelard believed that only with Lavoisier “(t)he scientific mind has . . . completely 
supplanted the pre-scientific mind” (Bachelard 1968, 47f.). According to Meyerson, “science 
in its entirety” takes place in the interval between on the one hand perceived, sensible every-
day reality which science destroys, and on the other hand the eventual “disappearance of 
matter (or the dissolution of substance) into the ether” which concludes the project of science 
(Meyerson 1991, 407). While “the claims of phlogiston theorists were also based on 
observation” (Meyerson 1991, 207), they did not employ the principle of conservation 
consistently, did not use that principle to destroy sensible reality, did not “impoverish reality 
to create legalistic science” (Meyerson 1991, 407), and they, therefore, spoke of chemical 
change in qualitative terms as if properties passed from one body to another (Meyerson 1991, 
206f.). Lavoisier employed a principle of conservation to institute a legalistic science which 
then creates “theoretical science by stripping reality as much as possible of any qualitative 
elements” (Meyerson 1991, 407), substituting the motion of invisible entities for the passage 
of sensible properties (Meyerson 1991, 206f., cf. 62ff.).19 “In a certain sense,” Meyerson adds, 
                                            
18 Latour details this process in a chapter on “The Historicity of Things: Where Were Microbes Before Pasteur?” (Latour 
1999, especially 164–172; see also Latour 2000). 
19 Compare Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent’s characterization of Lavoisier’s achievement: “In the act of weighing, Lavoisier 
sought to create an experimental space that was entirely under the experimenter’s control. Once balanced with weights on 
Lavoisier’s scale, substances were transformed from objects of nature to objects of science. The balance divested substances 
of their natural history. Their geographical and geological origins, their circumstances of production made little difference. 
They were transformed into samples of matter made commensurable by a system of standardized weights. […] In translating 
the conservation of elements’ qualities into quantitative and ponderal terms, the principle dodges the question how -in what 
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the quantitative beings of theoretical science are “even more substantial” than “the things we 
believe we perceive”: “They are assumed to be actual substances, and science, by taking away 
their qualitative aspect … added to their perdurability” (Meyerson 1991, 407). Thus, the 
essential form of our science appears to us to be shaped above all by the concern to explain 
that which changes by that which persists (Meyerson 1991, 130, cf. 119). 
On Meyerson’s interpretation, then, Lavoisier took an important step toward the fulfillment 
or realization of the Greek program in philosophy and science: He dissolves time into space 
and shows that qualitative change is not real while the underlying invisible elements are all 
the more real as they persist through mere displacements or changes of location.20 Meyerson 
thus takes the Lavoisian shift from one conception of substance to another as instituting just 
that idealized conception of science which Meyerson embraces. While Meyerson is explicitly 
committed to a metaphysical conception of science, his historical account yields an implicitly 
metachemical claim. Indifferent to the problem of existence and the ultimate foundation of 
reality, metachemistry concerns the processes by which reality is transformed. According to 
Meyerson, Lavoisian science is guided by a physical ideal and thereby transforms reality by 
dissolving matter into ether, time into space, that which is perceived into that which is 
inferred and, of course, chemical substance into physical substance. Meyerson’s implicit 
metachemistry came into its own when the further development of chemistry revealed that 
the “Lavoisian” ideal is just that—a particular metachemical stance among others, compelling 
but limited. According to Bachelard, these limitations became apparent and an explicit 
metachemistry became a possibility once certain tensions within the Lavoisian conception of 
science and substance became productive and served to differentiate Lavoisier’s 
substantialism or—in Bachelard’s terminology—once they “dialectized” it.21 
                                            
form- the elements are conserved. How do they subsist in compounds and how do they move from one compound to another 
during a reaction?” (Bensaude-Vincent 1992, 222ff.) 
20 According to Meyerson, Carnot’s principle concerning the irreversibility of time is factually true but irrational in that 
rational science follows the principle of causality that pre-supposes reversibility and the identity of antecedent and 
consequent; science thus “tends to the elimination of time.” Carnot’s principle asserts reality as it resists, from without, our 
scientific attempts at rationalizing it (cf. Meyerson 1930, 278, 286, 317). According to Meyerson, Carnot’s principle signifies 
a limit of science. 
21 However, cf. Bachelard’s remark that “a metachemistry came into being with the Mendeleef table” which appears to be 
at odds with the sustained emphasis on metachemistry as part of a new scientific spirit (Bachelard 1968, 49). 
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As with all dialectical movements, the development of alternative or differentiated 
metachemical stances and of non-Lavoisian science accentuates ambiguities that were 
already present in Meyerson’s conception of science as well as in Lavoisier’s conception of 
chemical substance.22 On the one hand, as described by Meyerson, Lavoisier physicalizes 
chemical substance by ruling that “in all the operations of art and nature, nothing is created.” 
On the other hand, as Bachelard points out, Lavoisier’s scientific practice and his definition 
of “element” establish that as the products of technique, substances are realized.23 
“Realizations have to be multiplied. One has more chance of knowing sugar by making 
sugars than by analyzing a particular sugar. In this plan of realizations, one is not 
looking for a generalization anyway, one is looking for a systematization, a plan. The 
scientific mind has then completely supplanted the pre-scientific mind. To our way of 
thinking, then (as opposed to Meyerson’s), this is reverse realism ... It is the foundation 
of chemical rationalism.” (1968, 47f.; emphases added) 
Bachelard’s remark articulates tensions within Lavoisian science: The creative work of 
scientists in Lavoisier’s laboratory is supposed to establish that nothing is created, and 
everything merely discovered. The nature of “sugar” arises from the making of “sugars,” and 
the substance in the singular appears not as an immediate likeness among the plurality of 
particulars but as a co-ordination of practices. The presumed nature informs research only as 
a category of possible experience for the representation of “sugar.” Instead of generalizing 
from the experience of an unchanging reality, the systematic course of inquiry and the plans 
of science carve out an unchanging reality. This is “reverse realism” in that reality appears 
not as the cause of perception but as the product of inquiry.24 And while Meyerson celebrates 
the intended product of Lavoisier’s science, Bachelard emphasizes its procedure. According 
                                            
22 “It is to be understood - we cannot stress this often enough - that a non-Lavoisian chemistry, like all the activities of the 
philosophy of non, does not deny the utility of classical chemistry, either for the past or for the future. It tends merely 
toward the organization of a more general chemistry, a pan-chemistry, just as pan-geometry tends to give the plan for the 
possibilities of geometrical organization” (Bachelard 1968, 55). 
23 Latour refers to Bachelard’s “un fait est fait” when he embarks upon his own project to show how it can be that facts are 
at the same time “fabricated” and “real” (Latour 1999, 127), how the statement “the ferment has been fabricated in my 
laboratory” can be understood as synonymous with “the ferment is autonomous from my fabrication” (Latour 1999, 135). 
24 According to Peirce, this “reverse” or Kantian realism is just realism plain and simple as opposed to nominalism that posits 
reality as prior to inquiry. Peirce articulates this in some of his earliest papers in Peirce (1992). Peirce reflects the tension 
between Meyerson’s explicitly metaphysical stance with its “nominalist” conception of a substantial and persistent reality 
and his implicitly metachemical account with its “realist” conception of science as effecting transformations and creatively 
producing reality in the metaphysical or nominalist image. 
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to Bachelard, it is this tension between intended representation and the making of it which 
gives rise (within the rationalized substantialism of Lavoisian science) to the non-
substantialism of a non-Lavoisian science that reflects this tension in its practice. 
 
 
NON-LAVOISIAN SCIENCE 
Bachelard only hints at this non-Lavoisian practice, and these hints can be patched together 
in a tentative manner at best.25 The most prominent among them strikes right at the heart of 
Lavoisian science with its reliance on principles of conservation: 
“As there are geometries which do not obey the displacement group, which are 
organized around other invariants, it is to be foreseen that there are chemistries which 
do not obey the conservation of matter26 and which could, therefore, be organized 
around some invariant other than that of mass.” (1968, 54) 
Bachelard says little about what these invariants might be, whether one of them will replace 
“mass” or whether non-Lavoisian science varies the invariants in order to gain a multi-
perspectival, properly dispersed access to the layers of reality. The latter possibility may be 
implicit in his suggestion of an alternative to Meyerson’s Lavoisian ideal:  
“It was believed that structural conditions decided everything, the idea being, no doubt, 
that one masters time when one is well organized in space, with the result that all 
temporal aspects of chemical phenomena came to be neglected. There was no 
appreciation of the fact that time was itself structured; no pains were taken to study 
rates, unfoldings, operations, transformations—along these lines, therefore, there is 
new knowledge to be gained.” (1968, 72)  
Depending on the level of organization or experimental intervention at which these 
transformations are studied, the new knowledge to be gained will differentiate the notion of 
substance. Bachelard suggests that in metachemical substance converge three separate 
notions, one of which is the traditional metaphysical conception of “sub-stance.” It is 
complemented by “sur-stance” and “ex-stance” (Bachelard 1968, 66). “Sub-stance” refers to 
what stands behind, beneath, or before the observed phenomena; “sur-stance” refers to what 
                                            
25 A more complete account might be reconstructible if one considered Bachelard (1932), the work of Georges Matisse who 
appears to have coined the term “non-Lavoisian” (Matisse 1938), perhaps Paul Renaud’s Structure de la Pensée et Définitions 
Expérimentales (1934) or the influence on Bachelard of Leo Brunschvicg (1937).  
26 The English edition accidentally prints “water” instead of “matter,” but see Bachelard (1981, 64).
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emerges in the process of realization, namely what Latour calls an institution which co-
ordinates human and non-human practices.27 “Ex-stance” finally refers to the excess of 
meaning that is not absorbed within a single coherent notion of substance and that tends to 
be overlooked by Latour.28 
Metachemistry would thus “disperse substantialism,” where the metaphor of dispersion is 
borrowed from spectrographic analysis (Bachelard 1968, 45). Extending this spectroscopic 
analogy, Bachelard represents the differentiation of “substance” by means of a chemical and 
not at all Freudian “psycho-analysis.” The spectrographic dispersion of substantialism 
produces spectro-lines of “substance” where the ensemble of the lines provides the psycho-
analysis of the mental construction of that concept. What Bachelard calls the epistemological 
 
profile of “substance” is of the same time a representation of its laminated reality, namely 
the successive layers of naive real- ism with its predicative use of “substance,” of rationalism 
or Kantianism in which substance is a category, of its “dynamization” in terms of sub-stance, 
sur-stance, ex- stance. The resultant profile would be similar to the one he produced for his 
personal notion of “mass” (Figure 1). Since “(p)hotochemistry, with the spectroscope, seems 
to be a non-Lavoisian chemistry” (Bachelard 1968, 58), Bachelard here draws in a self-
                                            
27 See note 15 above for the “emergence” of “sur-stance” (in the sense of an Aristotelian or Hegelian entelechy) and on how 
it was inspired by Wahl and Whitehead. 
28 See notes 31 and 35 below. 
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exemplifying manner on a non-Lavoisian technique to advance his argument for a non-
Lavoisian metachemistry. 
 
 
THE CHEMICAL TRAJECTORY OF PHYSICAL REALIZATION 
As opposed to metaphysics, metachemistry does not attempt to decide between naive realism 
and the various shades of rationalism; instead, it produces dispersion analyses of notions like 
substance or mass, fire or air, at various stages on their route toward the realization of the 
real. It is this route and the development of propositions over time that finally needs to be 
elucidated.  
“(W)here shall we find the facts that foreshadow, as we have come to believe, the non-
Lavoisian aspect of generalized chemistry?” Bachelard asks and immediately provides an 
answer: “They are to be found in the dynamization of chemical substance” (Bachelard 1968, 
55). He then begins to elaborate this dynamic and temporal, if not historical character of 
chemical substance:  
“(T)he reaction must henceforward be represented as describing a course, as forming a 
chain of various substantial states, or a movie film of substances ... Immediately a 
becoming defines itself underneath being. Now this becoming is neither unitary nor 
continuous. It presents itself as a sort of dialogue between matter and energy ... Energy 
is as real as substance and substance it not more real than energy. Through the 
intermediary of energy time puts its mark on substance. The former conception of a 
substance by definition, outside of time, cannot be maintained.” (1968, 56f.)  
The former conception of substance rendered it a hypothetical entity precisely because it was 
posited as that which persists through time. Even among those who agreed that the world is 
intelligible to the human mind only if the persistence of substantial characteristics is assumed, 
the gulf between realists and anti-realists opened up: With Whitehead, Locke, and most 
Kantians, anti-realists suspect that realists are transmuting a posit of the mind into a 
fundamental character of nature (see the discussion of Whitehead in the section on “The 
Substance of ‘Substance’” earlier). However, as soon as one lets “time put its mark on 
substance,” the hypothetical character of persistence drops out, and the old debate of realists 
versus anti-realists becomes obsolete. It is replaced by the question of how substance is 
instituted and how its reality becomes physically, socially, consciously realized over the 
course of time.  
 14 
Whitehead referred the institution of “substance” to the nexus of actual occasions or 
operations, i.e., to an intrinsically historical event. Bachelard goes on to pursue “the 
dynamization of substance” and considers its history as a series of events by adopting Paul 
Renaud’s metaphor of a “chemical trajectory” (Bachelard 1968, 61) that can be represented 
as a continuous line or curve:  
“It is quite natural to say ... that the substance being purified passes through successive 
states, and it is no far cry from here to the supposition that purification is continuous. If 
one hesitates to postulate this continuity, at least it is not difficult to accept ... that the 
purification can be represented by a continuous line.” (1968, 61)  
This continuous line represents the “incorporation, within the definition of substances, of the 
conditions needed to detect them” (Bachelard 1968, 59). In other words, “when one of the 
variables included in the representation is time and the other variable corresponds to some 
characteristic of substance,” a chemical trajectory becomes visible (Bachelard 1968, 64).  
What Bachelard is suggesting here is that one might graph the definition or institution of 
substance. This graph would represent a route or passage of purification. The choice of 
variables avoids the metaphysical pre-supposition that there is a stable “it” that is being 
purified. The apparent constancy of this “it” emerges only from the actually observed 
persistence of the characteristics over time, i.e., only from the tentative continuity of the line. 
In this sense, the “representation” provided by the graph is not a representation of reality but 
expresses the “supremacy of representation over reality” (Bachelard 1968, 62):  
“The representation of the purifying passage vouchsafes that there is a continuous “it” 
there.29 Substances thus emerge from the acquisition of more and more characteristics: 
They become more articulate and better articulated as they incorporate “more and more 
of the conditions needed to detect them.”” (1968, 59)  
In other words, substances become increasingly reliable or stable actors in experimental and 
technological interactions, i.e., as the situations are defined and become defined in which 
they will assert themselves in certain ways.30 The trajectory is, therefore, graphed in reference 
to two variables: The time that passes as the work of science goes on, and a scale that registers 
the increasing specificity of the characteristics with which the substance becomes identified.  
                                            
29 To Bachelard’s interest in “representation” (Bachelard 1968, 62–64) corresponds Latour’s appropriation of Whitehead’s 
“proposition” (Latour 1999, 141,148): Both terms elude the misleadingly dichotomized spheres of noumenon and 
phenomenon (Bachelard), of subject and object (Latour). 
30 The preceding sentences have begun to conflate Bachelard’s and Latour’s vocabularies. 
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In the course of his own metachemical investigations, Bruno Latour produced Bachelard’s 
graph. It represents not the discovery of Tasmania but its “construction” through the 
collaboration of navigators, explorers, ships, currents, coasts, mapmakers, etc. (Figure 2).  
Over time and through the collective work of scientists, some vague “it out there” acquires 
more and more characteristics, more and more associations, becomes institutionalized at the 
nexus of numerous occasions until it becomes “modern Tasmania” to which we now refer 
with great accuracy.31 Latour’s graph attempts to capture also how the gulf between realism 
and anti-realism is bridged by this representation of substance as vouchsafed by a “historic 
route of actual occasions” (Whitehead 1978, 80). 
 
 
                                            
31 While the construction and maintenance of a fact requires an unbroken trajectory, why should the trajectory also be 
straight? Jeff Ramsey raises this point (cf. Ramsey 1992): Does Latour’s anti-mentalism commit him to the view of an 
ineluctable conspiracy of associations that tends to agreement, stability, accrual of properties? If ideas or “epistemological 
breaks” play any role at all, can they do anything but introduce instability, open black boxes, unravel an accomplished 
reality? Substituting railway tracks for trajectories, an alternative approach is suggested by Max Weber: “Interests (material 
and ideal), not: ideas, immediately govern the actions of people. However, the worldviews that have been created by these 
ideas have often determined, like switchmen, the tracks along which action is propelled by the dynamics of interest” (Weber 
1920, 252). The notion of ideas providing direction and altering the course of events is consistent with Latour’s (and Peirce’s) 
emphasis on continuity and the unbroken chain of operations: “To scientific facts pertains as to frozen fish that the chain of 
coldness which keeps them fresh may not be interrupted, not even for a moment” (Latour 1995, 159). Thus, while the 
trajectory has to be unbroken, there is no need for it to be straight, and indeed it ambulates in Latour’s more recent graphs 
(Latour 2000, 256).  
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The “dream of realism” views the trajectory prospectively as the unfolding of a given 
substantial reality. Metaphysical realists would claim that Tasmania always was what it is, 
that it was merely discovered and has not substantially changed from the time when it was 
completely unknown and void of any specified characteristics, to today when it is articulated 
in great detail. Latour and the metachemistry of science consider a peculiar obsession this 
attempt to insist that “modern Tasmania” is identical to the eternal timeless substance that, 
on the dream of realism, must have been there all along.32 One can understand this obsession 
if one understands that for the metaphysician, the timelessness of substances serves as the 
foundation of the real and that, therefore, the denial of this identity would cast us into the 
abyss of relativism and deprive us of all reality (cf. Latour 1999, 3–9, 296). 
The “reality of constructivism,” on the other hand, views the graph’s point of origin as a 
fictitious common referent, the vague “it out there” to which characteristics gradually accrue 
and are imputed retroactively. The trajectory itself, i.e., the history of “Tasmania” links the 
dream of realism (world) and the reality of constructivism (language). Instead of pitting 
realism against constructivism, Latour argues that the dream of a stable reality is realized as 
stability is forged, and one of the characters that “Tasmania” acquires in the course of its 
interactions with navigators, map-makers, inhabitants is the character of obduracy or 
persistence.33 If things, objects, substances, and facts have histories, they may well have been 
different in the past and did not yet have certain defined traits before humans encountered 
them. However, Tasmania proved itself to be so steady and reliable that we readily 
extrapolate its existence into the future and the past, claiming by a kind of inductive 
argument that it possessed its most stable characteristics even before they acquired the 
character of stability-in-interactions.34 The metachemist Latour thus agrees with Whitehead, 
                                            
32 Latour’s critique of this obsession is discussed in Nordmann (2000). His critique exemplifies another dimension of his 
literally non-Lavoisian commitments, namely his view that experimentation should not be considered a zero-sum-game in 
which nothing is gained or lost. 
33 Compare Bachelard (1968, 13): “Chemical substance will come to be represented as a part—a mere part—of a process of 
differentiating; the real will come to be represented as a moment of realization well carried out.” 
34 “A little history spawns relativism,” writes Latour, “a great deal engenders realism” (Latour 1996, 91). If we historicize 
our ways of knowing only, we remain bound to metaphysics and open an abyss between eternal truth and constructed 
knowledge; if, however, we historicize the production as well as the objects of knowledge, a Peircean realism becomes 
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Bachelard, and- philosophically more radical and sophisticated than either of them -Charles 
Sanders Peirce. They all view reality as standing at the end of inquiry or appearing in its 
course. 
 
 
METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY, MATACHEMICAL HISTORY OF SCIENCE 
If metachemistry stands to metaphysics as chemistry to physics, what then is their relation? 
The answer to this question refers us to the thorny issue of whether physics is somehow 
fundamental or prior to chemistry - a loaded question in that the very notions of the 
“fundamental” and the “prior” have “metaphysics” and not metachemistry inscribed in them. 
Here is a tentative sketch of the relationship: Bachelard and Meyerson agree (but Latour 
tends to overlook35) that metaphysics posits the scientific picture of the world, i.e., conditions 
of intelligibility. Metaphysics is, in that sense, conceptually prior and ulterior; it formulates 
(as Meyerson emphasized most explicitly) an idealized anticipation of what science intends. 
In the language of Peirce, one should say that metaphysics introduces the hypothesis of 
reality. How must we conceive world and nature if we want to arrive at or realize a stable 
and representable reality? And in Kantian terms, one might say that metaphysics specifies 
the conditions for the possibility of objective knowledge. The world it posits is all that is the 
case, i.e., the static world of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus which is composed of discrete states of 
affairs and which is amenable to representation. The modern science of chemistry also 
intends such a world, and (meta)physics has, therefore, come into chemistry by way of 
conservation principles, by way of the periodic table and its interpretation in terms of 
                                            
possible. Peirce and Latour detail this possibility, both attempting to explain how the objects become known or determined 
in such a way that their acquired specifications appear timeless. What the object acquires over time is substance; in other 
words, it takes on a nature, and thus a substance can become something that it has always been. These proposals obviously 
require greater critical scrutiny; the brief account provided here is far too sketchy. Cf. note 24 above, Latour (1999, 145–
173).  
35 Perhaps, I should say “as Latour must overlook” since he sets to out to provide without reference to mental entities (ideas, 
beliefs) a symmetrical “anthropology” that can explain the world as it is today; that is, it can explain what is and through 
what activity it has become differentiated. In contrast, the metaphysical stance reflects on our representations of the world. 
Once one considers thinking a powerful, consequential, and continuous human activity that occasionally produces 
representations, one can appreciate the relation between Latour’s dynamically continuous metachemistry and a statically 
reflective metaphysics.  
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substantial atoms or in terms of molecules and an insubstantial plurality of elements. It also 
comes into chemistry by way of quantum mechanics and its attendant tools of analysis.36  
In contrast, metachemistry informs and traces the practice of science. Moving alongside 
science, it characterizes the stuff of science, namely the operations in the heads and 
laboratories of scientists: What kinds of transformation produce a durable representation of 
the world that can be fixed in thought as a world of representation? Any theory of inquiry, 
therefore, must treat objects and substances, instruments and propositions, models and 
theories, nature and culture, mind and matter metachemically on their historical trajectories. 
In the language of Peirce, one should say that metachemistry develops the hypothesis of 
reality: How do humans and nature interact in the fixation of belief and reality?37 If there 
were Kantian terms available here, they would concern the conditions for the synthesis of 
apperception. The later Wittgenstein, at any rate, considered metachemistry by trying to 
relate sentences like “all is flux” to the static world of the Tractatus. To the extent that 
chemistry is still a science of becoming (Earley 1981; Müller 1994) and to the extent that all 
sciences are engaged in the realization of the real, metachemistry extends from the practice 
of chemistry into the laboratories of physics.  
The priority of (meta)physics, therefore, consists in the scientifically intended image of an 
objectively knowable world, the final and formal causes of scientific inquiry. The priority of 
(meta)chemistry, on the other hand, consists in the synthetic making of this stable world of 
representation, the material, and efficient causes of scientific inquiry.  
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36 Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent has detailed the struggles and trade-offs that came with this fashioning of chemistry after 
a metaphysical image of science. 
37 Physics and metaphysics articulate a timeless, perhaps quantitative ontological framework, chemistry and metachemistry 
study genuine qualitative change, that is, processes that cannot be represented as displacements of material points. The 
picture I am invoking here of the relation between (meta)physics and (meta)chemistry has all the hallmarks of late 19th-
century scientific philosophy. It is questionable, of course, whether this picture has survived the 20th century. 
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